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Abstract
The central zone of New Belgrade has been under tentative 
protection by the law of the Republic of Serbia; it is slowly 
gaining the long-awaited canonical status of cultural prop-
erty. However, this good news has often been overshadowed 
by the desperation among the professionals, the fear among 
flat owners and the fury among politicians: the first because 
they grasp the scale of the job-to-be-done, the last because it 
interferes with their hopes and wishes, and the second because 
they are stuck between the first and the third group. This whirl-
pool of interests shows many properties of New Belgrade, that 
stretch far beyond the oversimplified narratives of ‘the unbuilt 
capital of Yugoslavia’, ‘the largest dormitory of Belgrade’ and 
‘the unrestrained modernist playground’. 
This paper attempts to offer other points and value nods to 
those that are the most frequently used, from the complexity of 
the integrative efforts to the emergence of this new city, as well 
as the omitted and overlooked aspects of its reconstruction, 
deregulation and failure. The focus of the paper is the emer-
gence, the use and the disappearance of the peculiar Yugoslav 
prefabricated housing, the path less travelled.
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1 Introduction
It might be difficult for us today to grasp the joy and enthu-
siasm of the post-war generation of planners and builders, once 
New Belgrade had started to emerge from the swampy sand 
of the left bank of the Sava river. The symbolic burden of the 
vast marshland, which served as a no-mans-land between the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empire, could not be automatically 
annulled after the formation of the first Yugoslavia in 1918. 
It took another twenty-something years, a world war and a 
revolution to get there. However, as well as the political and 
economic issues, there was a set of organisational and techno-
logical obstacles to creating this city.
The author would argue that without the integration of 
industrialisation and urban planning, New Belgrade would not 
have been possible to build, at least not in such a ratio of time-
to-space coverage, as we know it today. Similarly, it is this, in 
many ways intangible heritage, that needs to be emphasised, 
further researched and understood when examining the physi-
cal structure of New Belgrade. This paper refers to  mass hous-
ing as  mass heritage for two main reasons: first, the scale and 
numbers of it, as something quite different from the heritage 
previously known; and second, due to  its emergence on a vast 
scale in a short period, which required effective and integrated 
organisation of the production process, the aspects of which is 
described in the text.
2 The Development of New Belgrade: Struggle, 
Makeshift, Integration
By 1946, the left bank of the Sava was set to become the new 
capital of the new, second, socialist Yugoslavia. This was seen 
as proving to all the “doubters” that the Yugoslavs – after lib-
erating and reclaiming their country – had the will, the energy 
and the knowledge to build their capital from scratch; the fund-
ing was a separate issue. Early on, Yugoslavia took a separate 
path from the Soviet Union model of socialism, which led the 
Eastern bloc to expel Yugoslavia with the Kominform resolu-
tion in 1948. This caused the deepening of the already severe 
economic crisis in the country ravaged by the war. Yugoslavia 
depended on international assistance, but the roots of the new 
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economy were based both on Soviet knowledge and experi-
ences – and on Soviet loans. Hence, many processes came to 
a halt simply because there was no funding whether it was the 
construction of the building for the Presidency of the Govern-
ment of FNRJ (later the Federal Executive Council) or draining 
the swamp of the future site of the New Belgrade; the same rule 
applied – no funding available.
Fig. 1 Federal Executive Council’s unfinished building, beginning of the 
1960s. Source: Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade
Although obviously very expensive and labour intensive, the 
construction of the new capital would pay off in the long run. 
The land was not owned by anyone, except for small areas in 
the Army’s possession – hence there was no need for expropria-
tion. The area was a swamp, hence no need to create tabula rasa 
conditions in the Le Corbusian sense of the term, by tearing 
down the existing structures. Furthermore, the centuries-old 
biohazard of the unregulated swamp in the centre of Belgrade 
would be  removed, and the city would get additional land for 
expansion - housing being the biggest priority in this case.
Informed by examples of countries that were already ahead 
in housing construction, Yugoslavia took its first steps towards 
building the capacities for an industrialised housing economy. 
This was a path taken energetically both by the East and the 
West, to resolve the worsening housing crisis, as the result of 
the war. The First Five Year Plan (1947-1951) of Yugoslavia, 
which had the power of a federal legal act, explicitly stated the 
industrialisation of housing construction as one of the country’s 
priorities, alongside the specific names of the cities that would 
receive special attention. Belgrade (together with Ljubljana and 
Titograd) was one of them since it had to become the appro-
priate capital to the federation and house the most important 
administrative, cultural and educational facilities. Above all, 
the much-needed planning institutions, that would be able to 
absorb and deal with the amount of work ahead of them. These 
were all the necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of New 
Belgrade, but it took almost a decade for these actors to, first, 
consolidate, and then coordinate among themselves – for the 
city to start to emerge as a result of their integrated actions.
3 The Path of Industrialization: “Crane” and 
“Gabarit” Urban Planning
In 1955, the federal competition for new industrial housing 
typologies took place. By this year, the construction of the first 
housing blocks on the outskirts of New Belgrade, in Tošin bunar, 
had already been finished. However, the uproar that the project 
caused was still present and being resolved: never again was a 
design like this to be built in Yugoslavia, especially not in New 
Belgrade. The design by Vrbanić and Ilić, architects of the tran-
sitional office, the “Institute for the study and concretisation of 
the problems of New Belgrade”, was based on adapted concept 
of Soviet microrayons, that was just (re)emerging from scholarly 
literature. Above all, the typology was the same type of modest 
workers housing that was being built all over the country: a hip-
roof sitting on top of the five-story structure with perforated con-
crete elements on the facade. What was even worse, the applied 
type of construction and the layouts were something that the 
profession strived to eliminate. The ‘reinforced brickwork’ and 
small ‘housemaid’ rooms of this block were heavily criticised at 
the Counsel of Yugoslav architects in Dubrovnik in 1950, which 
was also considered to be the profession’s final rupture from 
even the smallest traces of socialist realism in Yugoslav architec-
ture, and a rupture from traditional construction.
Fig. 2 The housing estate Tošin bunar (Block 7, New Belgrade), beginning of 
the 1960s. Source: Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade
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The rupture was easy to follow through in case of exterior 
design and design layout. When it came to technology and plan-
ning – bricks would never disappear from Yugoslav construc-
tion sites, alongside with the microrayon planning concept, 
which went hand in hand with industrialisation practices. It was 
simply the pragmatic thing to do: although set for the path of 
full industrialisation, soon it was clear that the circumstances 
were favourable for semi-prefabricated types of structures 
with considerable improvising and prototyping. New Belgrade 
proved to be a perfect polygon for such experimentation. The 
construction companies would start using (and later upgrad-
ing) certain technological solutions – which mainly consisted 
of applying open systems of prefabrication. Encouraged by the 
administrative, financial and logistical support of the state for 
the industrialisation programmes, many companies went in this 
direction: buying the equipment, forming research offices and 
laboratories, and most important – experimental construction 
sites. A competition would occasionally be announced, and 
afterwards, a construction site would be open for bidding. 
Fig. 3 Blank map of the Regulation Plan of the Area of New Belgrade 
Municipality, 1962. Source: Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade
As the planning authorities took it upon themselves to carry 
out a “review of Yugoslav architecture” (Stojanović, p. 224, 
GMGB 21), professional competitions were a convenient tool 
for planning. However, some framework had to be provided 
after a (lost?) decade and a half of research, experimenting and 
planning (without realisation). This aspect is not discussed in 
this paper, rather the realised plan: The Regulation Plan of the 
Area of New Belgrade Municipality from 1962 (leads: Milutin 
Glavički, Aleksandar Đorđević). The plan was produced fol-
lowing the design competition for the Central Zone of New 
Belgrade and Block 21, and would introduce the concept of 
the blank map, where just a gabarit or template of a block or 
building would be drawn, depending on the stage of detailed 
planning. Through later designing processes, this gabarit would 
be filled in with functions and details of the elevation. The 
word ‘gabarit’ came from French terminology, and the correct 
translation would be ‘regulation’ or ‘template’. However, the 
foreign term stuck as a way of naming this specific practice 
in planning; later, it came to be used as a pejorative term to 
defame the planners and the city itself.
Fig. 4 The layout of Central Zone per the plan of Branko Petričić, part of 
the General (Master) Plan of Belgrade from 1950. Source: Urban Planning 
Institute Belgrade
The plan, from 1962, absorbed the previously built structures 
of Tošin bunar and Community (mesna zajednica) Fontana, 
blocks 1-5, built per the plan of Branko Petričić, as a segment 
of the General (Master) Plan of Belgrade from 1950. Petričić’s 
plan was the important transitory solution between the men-
tioned hip-roofed units on the very edge of the New Belgrade’s 
rayon, and the (high) modernist Central Zone, the peak of the 
city’s design. The construction of Central Zone was constantly 
delayed, waiting for better conditions in terms of planning, 
design and technology. Petričić was working his way towards it 
by adapting the urban and architectural layouts to facilitate the 
application of prefabricated systems, through using the arche-
typal modernist structures: tower, slab and meander. The layouts 
were organised in such a way as to keep clear the central and 
peripheral area of the block, so the crane for the construction 
could easily move the prefabricated pieces of structure, stored 
in the centre of the block. Hence ‘crane urbanism’ - urbanism 
which revolves around prefabricated technology.
The practice would continue with planning and building the 
Central Zone, which was the major milestone in the planning of 
the city. The plan from 1962 was essentially one of the results 
of the competition for the Central Zone from 1960. It produced 
a layout for the Central Zone, a layout for Block 21 as a module 
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and model urban unit of the zone, which elaborated the process 
of developing the zone via the experimentation in planning, 
designing and building. Its demise would eventually lead to 
the disastrous hijacking of these practices and the construction 
of the structures on the axis of the zone, in Blocks 24, 25 and 
26, that in many ways, did not correspond to the original plan.
Fig. 5 Photo of the modular model of New Belgrade in the Urban Planning 
Institute: after each competition, a detailed plan is developed, block by block, 
and placed onto the large model of blank blocks according to the plan from 
1962. Source: collection of Miloš Jurišić.
Fig. 6 The view of New Belgrade from Brankova Street: in  focus, is  Block 
21 under construction (buildings S1-6 and B8 & B9); to the right, the Federal 
Executive Council, and  to the left, the Old Fairground. cca. 1965. Source: 
collection of Miloš Jurišić.
4 The Implementation: From Dynamic Urban 
Laboratory to Socialist Corporatism
The challenge of New Belgrade was multifaceted. Once the 
draining of the swamp was completed, there were other prob-
lems to resolve. Although it seemed an ideal site to design and 
plan on, construction on this terrain was quite a complex issue. 
The foundations of the city were on sand of a low load-bear-
ing capacity, which meant that pile foundations would be 
required; this option was more expensive and demanded ade-
quate equipment, as well as additional time for the structures to 
set. The challenge was to keep the density of construction low, 
have as light structures as possible and prevent the flooding 
of the area. The perimeter blocks were built using the tradi-
tional technology, but the more the city approached its centre, 
the more sophisticated technology and design would get. Not 
many investors could take up this venture. Consequently, the 
Yugoslav People’s Army was the major investor, alongside the 
Republic of Serbia’s and Federation administration. 
The contractors were the companies connected to the Army, 
mainly GP Napred, but also Ratko Mitrović, 7. juli and Hidro-
gradnja Čačak. These companies were pioneers in applying 
prefabrication and semi-prefabrication technology, based on 
the home-grown systems IMS Žeželj and Jugomont. As pre-
viously referred to, the emergence of these technologies was 
initiated by a state-organised competition, and implementation 
immediately followed – on many sites all over the country. New 
Belgrade was no exception, but the implementation of the pre-
fabricated systems had some peculiarities. Only light prefabri-
cated structures could be used, designed to reduce the weight of 
the building. The most famous among them was the prestressed 
IMS Žeželj system, designed by Branko Žeželj with New Bel-
grade in mind. The weight of the building was 30% less than 
usual, could be built very quickly and use a variety of finishes 
since the structural load-bearing elements were separate from 
the facade and interior elements; it could be assembled by the 
previously non-qualified workforce after a minimum of train-
ing. Furthermore, the system was favoured by architects, due 
to its considerable flexibility: the competition calls would often 
state that the housing estates should be designed for prefabri-
cated technology, so IMS was often the first choice. 
The IMS Institute held the patent to the system, which was 
sold to different construction companies - alongside other sys-
tems such as Jugomont - who would then have to find a way 
to merchandise and sell their services. These companies would 
eventually go on to compete for public tenders for the construc-
tion of these estates and blocks. However, the state authorities 
would often intervene, via investors, for the companies to split 
the jobs and keep the orders coming to those less favoured – in 
order to stay solvent. Hence, from the very beginning, the pro-
cess of industrialisation of the construction was undermined 
by the process of industrial pauperisation, which was also the 
major problem of the New Belgrade Central Zone. The combi-
nation was almost typical – a company using the new prefabri-
cated system, paired with a company using modified traditional 
technology, overridden and somewhat forced into a semi-pre-
fabrication production typology. 
Block by block; it looks somewhat like the following: 
Block 21 was built by two companies. One was Komgrap - a 
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fading state-owned giant, somewhat specialised for building 
the ‘infills’ in the city centre. This company built the high-
rises the classic way, by casting skeletal structure on site and 
filing it with prefabricated ceilings and building the regular 
walls. The other one was GP Neimar – the Army’s construc-
tion company, which bought IMS Žeželj patents and started 
experimenting with the technology on this very site. Block 22 
was also built by GP Neimar, just like Building 5 in Block 23 
– the rest of which was built by GP Ratko Mitrović using the 
moving formwork technology. Block 28 was an experiment 
within the experiment, but nevertheless, the first fully indus-
trialised site with a peculiar funding scheme. The block was 
built by the JINGRAP consortium of four developers, as a part 
of the effort of building for the market1 and with UN technical 
assistance for improving the features of the technology. Block 
30 was also built by a consortium of five companies, combin-
ing semi prefabricated and prefabricated solutions. This block 
had two major changes to the architectural layout due to false 
assumptions about embassies and foreign representatives being 
potential buyers. However, this was not the case; consequently, 
the size of apartments had to be reduced to smaller units to 
sell more easily to local companies, causing a lot of havoc and 
problems with design and construction.
Block 29 was constructed by a single company, GP Rad, 
but it’s development was funded and organized by the busi-
ness consortium of various companies called INPROS, joined 
by the City’s Housing Company. This block shows the signs of 
the corruption of the system that was already set in motion on 
other sites. Two typical examples included  invited or internal 
competitions for employees of INPROS, which set in motion 
the non-transparent decisions about the societal property; the 
land concession was transferred to  INPROS, which built and 
sold the lucrative part – the housing; the land for the rayon 
centre was kept unbuilt for 30 years, and then taken by one of 
the remaining members of the consortium to - build and sell 
the lucrative componenent, which was housing, but in the sit-
uation of changed socio-economic and legal circumstances. A 
similar situation applied in case of Block 24, but with the heavy 
influence of Energoprojekt whose architects, Bogdan and Vlad-
imir Slavica won the competition for this block by creating a 
post-modernist coat of silicate brick and pitched roof for the 
“good old” IMS Žeželj structure. The circle was finally closed: 
thirty years later, New Belgrade was back at the beginning, 
masking its modern identity. On a larger scale, that was the 
end of the central axis of the Central Zone. As per the Po-Mo 
1 Market is here referred to as a specific type of closed market that func-
tioned only for the companies, buying the flats for their employees and then dis-
tributing within the company/organization by the priority lists. A private person 
could obtain an apartment in a different way: by joining/forming a cooperative, 
or building a private house – but only in very limited amount of locations in 
Belgrade. Hence, the explosion of illegal and informal construction.
paradigm, the buildings were positioned randomly in the block, 
creating a visual and material barrier to continue any planning 
according to the plan from 1962; there were no central func-
tions, but again, just housing.
Fig. 7 Block 28 and the infrastructure being built. In the background, the 
building of the Federal Executive Council, cca. 1970. Source: Urban Planning 
Institute. 
Fig. 8 Elevations and urban layout of Building 4 in Block 24, 1986. Source: 
Historical Archive of the City of Belgrade.
However, this was not the sole problem – the Energoprojekt 
was in crisis, having difficulties getting enough work abroad 
to maintain the company. So, the company shifted its focus 
inward, to the local market, for which it was oversized and not 
well adjusted. Being primarily oriented towards export, Ener-
goprojekt ran its business as per local regulation - mostly based 
on international and British (colonial) law, since it operated 
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mainly in former colonies. The company even earned its rep-
utation in the country as being the socialist corporation, a 
somewhat privileged business that operated within some blurry 
framework of ‘in-betweenness’. During the 1980s, when the 
country started collapsing, management of this (and many sim-
ilar) company (companies) ‘went rogue’ and started exploiting 
the system, either in a desperate need not to go bankrupt or 
gradually preparing for the transition to capitalism. The lan-
guage was already there: it is enough to just browse through 
the bulletins of this organisation and notice the discrepancy 
between the official language of the company and that of the 
legal system (still) in power. The moment was also convenient 
for this kind of action: while the project was developed - it was 
already the 1990s, a very difficult period for the city and the 
country, which soon dissolved into a bloody war. The blocks 
of New Belgrade were especially despised by everyone as the 
legacy of communism, so the laissez-faire gained a new, spatial 
interpretation. Consequently, based on the results of the inter-
nal competition for architectural design of Arena, Energopro-
jekt got the land. Instead, to the side of the Block 25, as per the 
new plan from 1986, the building was set centrally, undermin-
ing further the planning process and continuing to build a string 
of barriers on the axis of the Central Zone. Block 26 was and 
still is more of the same, but with a difference, that of having 
two companies, Napred and Energoprojekt, building and fight-
ing over the land that today is, officially, their property, just like 
the buildings they built on it in the 2000s. 
Fig. 9 Plan of the Central Zone from 1986 with the Arena’s planned position 
(left) and Arena upon construction centrally located in Block 25, cca. 2006. 
Source: Bulletins of Energoprojekt from November 15th, 1991 and Jubilee 
Catalog from 2006.
5 The Hybrid Approach to Planning? A Side Note on 
the Urban Planning Institute(s)
The story of New Belgrade cannot be told without introduc-
ing the institution in charge of its planning. It should be noted 
that the New Belgrade construction came as a great surprise 
to the rest of the world, since it was the local institutes that 
were planning, designing and building the city. Foreign corre-
spondents were obsessed with the project, constantly flocking 
to the offices of the heads of the Urban Planning Institute of 
the City of Belgrade. This surprise was entirely because there 
was no previous experience of such a scale. No city had been 
built from scratch in the country, at least not in recent history, 
so the profession had no previous experience. Very early on, 
after the end of the Second World War, it was decided that the 
Yugoslav administration would allocate resources to establish 
the professional networks of - among others - a hierarchical 
string of federal - republic - regional - city planning institu-
tions. These institutions started developing their approaches to 
various urban designs, resolving the problems of the commu-
nities. If they were to learn from their own mistakes – let them 
learn! However, it WILL be design-and-build and in-the-house/
country project! 
The important thing to point out, in this case, was the 
grooming of local expertise, which had two major aspects to 
its background.The personnel emerged from peculiar schools of 
architecture in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, and there  was 
continuous exposure to foreign influences and circulation of 
knowledge, mostly uninterrupted by the mainstream Cold War 
politics. The local schools of architecture and urban planning 
maintained different scholarly approaches over the years, given 
the fact that the first experts were educated abroad. The Bel-
grade school was particularly interesting. When the school of 
architecture, with predominantly polytechnic curriculum, was 
established at the end of 19th century, expertise came mostly 
with scholars from the Austro-Hungarian empire, Germany and 
Switzerland. After the First World War, the situation changed: it 
was the UK, France and Czechoslovakia who accepted Yugoslav 
scholars. A significant boost to the profession came from Russia, 
as an unexpected effect of the October Revolution – White Rus-
sian refugees were immediately employed by the Kingdom’s 
Ministry of Construction. Other parts of Yugoslavia also had 
various international connections, and all these thoughts and 
influences clashed together in the three schools of architecture 
of this new nation. However, it was only after the Second World 
War that the progressive ideas of modernists were achieved: an 
entire generation was frustrated by the corruption and the open 
obstruction by the inter-war municipal authorities2.
In post-war Belgrade, it was the Urban Planning Institute of 
the City of Belgrade that dealt with the development of the city, 
and within it, there was an independent department for New 
Belgrade. This institute was well integrated and very well con-
nected within the network of Yugoslav institutes of urban plan-
ning, founded and organised basically on the re-adapted Soviet 
model of central planning offices, but with an avid level of 
autonomy. However, due to the previously mentioned plurality 
of the professional scene, the specificities of the reconstruction 
and production of the space, scale, and legal framework, quite 
early on, it was clear that a local approach must be developed. 
Due to the specific nature of their work, the institutes were 
receiving literature and journals from all over the world, 
2 Well described by a significant researcher of urbanism of Serbia, Branko 
Maksimović, who would write for newspapers about the speculation with the 
land & administrative region of Belgrade and non-implementation of planning 
documents (later published in his book, p.45-48).
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completely blurring the boundaries of the Cold War. The library 
of the Institute still has Architektura Warszawa next to Japan 
Architect - or more accurately, a sequence of periodicals from 
the most important productions of the world. Furthermore, all 
of the prominent institutes had started their publishing activ-
ity, out of which the internal-use edition of the Translations 
(Prevodi) was the most interesting one. In these publications, 
one could find a set of texts, which were selected and trans-
lated based on the current needs of the planning institution 
that was publishing the texts. Hence, even though many of the 
plans were lost, it is possible to retrace the production based 
on the titles: Man, flat and neighbourhood (FR) or Practices 
and Experiences in the Policy of the Expropriation (BE) or The 
Construction of the Viennese Metro System (AT). The institutes’ 
network would constantly make comparative studies of foreign 
cases and legal documents, and put together publications of 
translations, analysis and finally – synthesis, as a follow-up, 
and distribute them to the network Yugoslav institutes to use. 
Fig. 10 Cover of the translations (Prevodi). Source: Source: Urban Planning 
Institute.
6 Conclusion: Mass Housing as (Mass) Heritage?
The current condition of the ensemble in New Belgrade is 
not particularly good. The years of use, neglect and disrepair 
of the architecture and constant pressure on the urban fabric, 
increasingly being further developed and reshaped, are chang-
ing the appearance of this area of the city. Saturation point is 
approaching: New Belgrade was the best possible gift to any of 
the post-Yugoslav governments in Serbia and Belgrade, provid-
ing a lot of infrastructurally equipped greenfield zones, which 
are now almost all built or in the process. The green areas are 
under threat as they are being targeted as building land, while 
the existing structures are looked upon as a prey for develop-
ers: as potential sites for energy sanitation and extension/expan-
sion projects, with the addition of floors or balconies. On the 
other side, the heritage protection services are reluctant to deal 
with this heritage, because, under current circumstances, it is 
an overwhelming amount of work that surpasses their capac-
ities. Hence, mass housing is gradually becoming a massive 
problem, that would need an appropriate, mass solution. The 
author would argue that we need to go back and consider the 
experiences of its emergence: as a product of many organised, 
small-series, customised productions, well planned and profes-
sionally debated on so many levels.
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